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Abstract 
Inspired by the work on social change through generational/cohort replacement of Karl 
Mannheim and Norman Ryder—who coined the notion of Demographic Metabolism—
this paper suggests the application of the methods of multi-dimensional mathematical 
demography to forecast the changing composition of the population by relevant 
individual characteristics that go far beyond the traditional age, sex and place of 
residence. It is claimed that unlike many so-called theories in the social sciences—
which mostly are just classification schemes—this model actually meets the 
falsifiability criteria of Popper and Lakatos that for the latter distinguishes a theory from 
“pseudoscience”. As presented here, this theory can make quantitative predictions of 
socioeconomic change with only a narrow margin of uncertainty for decades into the 
future. The paper gives two very different examples of predictions based on this theory: 
one for the hard and sticky characteristic of highest educational attainment where higher 
human capital of the future labor force is safely predicted for countries that recently 
experienced expansions in school enrollment and another for the soft and more volatile 
characteristic of European identity which shows significant inter-cohort increases that 
will likely result in a higher future prevalence of a European identity in addition to a 
national one among the electorate of the EU.  This new theory has the potential to 
finally providing the social sciences with a paradigm with true (quantitative) predictive 
power for decades into the future.  
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Demographic Metabolism: A Theory of Socioeconomic Change 
with Predictive Power 
Wolfgang Lutz  
1 Introduction 
This paper introduces a general theory of how societies change as a consequence of the 
changing composition of its members with respect to certain relevant and measurable 
characteristics of people. These characteristics can either change over the life course of 
people or from one generation to the next. While the former can be analytically captured 
and described by certain age- and duration-specific transition schedules, the latter 
changes resulting from cohort replacement can be modeled and projected using standard 
models of population dynamics.  
Building on earlier qualitative work by Karl Mannheim and Norman Ryder - 
who introduced the notion of “demographic metabolism” - this new formal theory 
applies the quantitative tools of multi-dimensional mathematical demography to 
forecast the future composition of a population according to relevant characteristics.  In 
the case of persistent characteristics (such as highest educational attainment) that 
typically do not change from young adulthood until the end of life, quantitative 
predictions about the distributions of such characteristics in the population can readily 
be made for several decades into the future.  For other characteristics that tend to change 
over the life course (such as labor force participation) standard age/duration-specific 
patterns can be assumed. Hence, unlike other models that are called “theories” but 
cannot be used to make explicit quantitative statements about the future, this theory of 
socioeconomic change can make such statements in a way that can potentially be 
falsified. It can therefore be called a theory with predictive power according to Karl 
Popper’s criteria (Popper 1959). 
To avoid misunderstandings from the beginning: This is not a theory predicting 
individual behavior but rather predicting aggregate level change. It is by its very nature 
a macro-level theory focusing on the changing composition of a population and hence 
does not have any micro-level analogue.  
 It can be called a “demographic” theory of socioeconomic change implying that 
the inspiration and approach of the theory is demographic but its purpose is not. It is not 
primarily intended to explain and forecast demographic variables (such as population 
size, births rates, death rates, migrations and alike) but the goal of this theory is to 
predict socioeconomic change in a broader sense (ranging from values and religions to 
skills and productivity of the labor force) using a demographic paradigm. One may 
think of it in the same way that an economic theory of human fertility tries to explain 
fertility changes using the paradigms and the toolbox of economics but does not try to 
explain economic outcomes, only the birth rate. Similarly this demographic theory tries 
to explain socioeconomic change using the general approach and the toolbox of 
demography. 
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The title of the paper uses the notion of “Socioeconomic change”. Change here 
refers to observable aggregate level changes over time in the structure of societies and 
economies. In particular, it refers to the changing composition of societies with respect 
to the relative sizes of sub-groups that influence the overall behavior of the system. 
Change is in this sense the antipode to steady-state or stationarity. The notion 
“socioeconomic” is used in this paper in a very broad sense as describing the interface 
between society and the economy and covering forces and variables that matter for both. 
It is not meant to suggest preference for any specific school of thinking or a particular 
scientific approach. It is seen as a neutral term to try to describe at the aggregate level 
what is usually called socioeconomic variables at the individual and household level.  
The final notion in the title of this paper is that of “predictive power”. What does 
predictive power mean in the social sciences?  A conventional definition of predictive 
power goes as follows: “The predictive power of a scientific theory refers to its ability 
to generate testable predictions. Theories with strong predictive power are highly 
valued, because the predictions can often encourage the falsification of the theory. The 
concept of predictive power differs from explanatory and descriptive power (where 
phenomena that are already known are retrospectively explained by a given theory) in 
that it allows a prospective test of theoretical understanding. Scientific ideas that do not 
confer any predictive power are considered at best ‘conjectures’, or at worst 
‘pseudoscience’. Because they cannot be tested or falsified in any way, there is no way 
to determine whether they are true or false, and so they do not gain the status of 
‘scientific theory’.” (cited from Wikipedia for the key word “Predictive power”, January 
15, 2012). This strong definition of predictive power leaves much of the social sciences 
without predictive power because there the focus is typically more on description and 
explanation rather than prediction (von Wright 2004). However, according to the 
demarcation criterion of Imre Lakatos (a student of Karl Popper who focused 
extensively on the social sciences) a theory that fails to make any novel predictions of 
previously unknown phenomena should be classified as pseudoscience (Lakatos 1978). 
In the natural sciences this testing of predictions can usually be done by carrying out 
experiments. In social sciences, where large scale experiments are difficult or 
impossible to conduct (although there are some “natural experiments”), predictions of 
the evolution of socioeconomic phenomena over time are the best way to test the 
predictive power. In the context of the theory considered here the predictive strength of 
the demographic approach is in part facilitated through the fact that it largely refers to 
changes in rather inert stock variables with the more difficult to project flows (based on 
behavior) influencing the distributions only at the margin. Karl Popper (personal 
communication1) actually considered this a great strength of demography as compared 
to other social sciences. 
This paper will be structured in the following way: First I will discuss the 
writings of Karl Mannheim and Norman Ryder who had earlier suggested that the 
process of social change can be analytically captured through the process of younger 
cohorts replacing older ones. This will be followed by a presentation and discussion of 
the basic propositions of the theory and a description of the multi-dimensional 
demographic model that is used to model the changing composition of the population 
over time.. Finally, the broad range of possible empirical applications of this theory is 
illustrated through two empirical examples from very different domains: The first one 
reconstructs and projects the changing composition of the population by the highest 
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level of educational attainment. This is a highly relevant individual characteristic that 
can be unambiguously measured and is sticky (persistent over the life course) after a 
certain age. The second example for possible applications of this theory addresses a 
rather “soft” variable such as the prevalence of European identity in addition to national 
identity. Forecasting the prevalence of European identity has undoubtedly great 
significance for the future of the European Union. The paper concludes with a brief 
outlook discussing further possible applications and important implications of this new 
theory of socioeconomic change with predictive power. 
2 Antecedents:  Karl Mannheim and Norman Ryder 
Few ideas are entirely new in human history. In a rather general and vague form the 
idea that societies change as new generations take over is as old as human reflection and 
one finds early writings on this topic already with the pre-Socratic philosophers and 
with Confucian philosophy. It is such a plausible concept corresponding so well to 
everyday life experiences in most families, institutions and companies across all 
cultures and times that it is indeed surprising how little systematic scientific efforts have 
been made so far to comprehensively and formally describe this important force of 
socioeconomic change. While this is true even for the systematic analysis of historical 
evolutions, it is even more the case when it comes to using this force of inter-cohort 
change as the basis for forecasting. 
When searching through the social science and history literature of the past two 
centuries, the one strain of writing that seems to come closest to the idea of projecting 
along cohort lines (the approach proposed here), is the literature on the succession of 
generations which was prominent in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in history (and 
even history of art) for explaining the sequence of different historical epochs which, 
under this view, was driven by the replacement of old generations by new ones with 
new views of the world, new priorities and new styles. A comprehensive synthesis of 
this approach was offered by the sociologist, Karl Mannheim, in his 1927 essay on “The 
Problem of Generations” (Mannheim 1927, 1952). More than a generation later the 
demographer Norman Ryder published a seminal article in the “American Sociological 
Review” (Ryder 1965) entitled “The cohort as a concept in the study of social change”. 
Up to this day this article is the key reference for anybody dealing with cohort analysis. 
Given Ryder’s demographic background it is somewhat surprising that this paper is 
entirely qualitative in nature, even without a single table. And at no point in this paper 
Ryder refers to the great potential of this cohort approach for not only studying past but 
also forecasting future social change.  Since these writings of Mannheim and Ryder 
stand out as the most visible and most influential milestones in explaining social change 
through cohort replacement and hence form the historical basis on which this new 
theory will build intellectually, the following paragraphs will study them in some detail. 
Karl Mannheim was of Hungarian origin and in 1930 became Professor of 
Sociology in Frankfurt before he left for England, where he taught at London 
University. His writings are partly in German and partly in English. His work on 
generations is only one – and during his life time not the most prominent – aspect of his 
scientific opus. In his essay on “The problem of Generations” (first published in 
German in 1927) Mannheim starts out by contrasting two opposite views on 
generations: One that he calls “positivist” and which is focused on measurement and 
studying the average periods of time taken for the older generation to be superseded by 
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the new in public life (p. 278). He calls this approach as having a biological perspective 
which we could safely translate in terms of meaning demographic. The opposite 
approach, which he calls “romantic-historical”, is distinctly non-quantitative and 
associated with the writings of the German historian, Dilthey. Here the central notion is 
that of “entelechy” which is meant to be the expression of the “inner aim” or its “inborn 
way of experiencing life and the world” of one generation. Mannheim seems clearly 
more amenable to the first view, but his focus was only on looking backwards, trying to 
understand the forces driving history, rather than looking into the future. 
Mannheim defines a generation as being determined by its “social location” 
(German: soziale Lagerung), something that the members of a generation all share. He 
compares it to the way one is a member of a specific social class, viewed not cross-
sectionally but over time: both generation and class “endow the individuals sharing in 
them with a common location in the social and historical process, and thereby limit 
them to a specific range of potential experience, predisposing them for a certain 
characteristic mode of thought and experience, and a characteristic type of historically 
relevant action”. (p. 291). He goes on to discuss what produces generation units and 
under what conditions a new group of people growing up is sufficiently different from 
the previous one in order to be called a new generation. This is where Mannheim’s 
sociological approach, which is still to some extent trying to capture the qualitative 
inner spirit of a generation, is quite different from the more formal cohort approach 
proposed here, where inner values (entelechy) may be a consequence but not a defining 
criterion for membership in a generation. 
There is one other decisive difference in the proposed new approach to that of 
Mannheim: Members of a generation (cohort in our case) are not all required to have the 
same social location, i.e., be similar in key aspects. Quite the opposite, we will consider 
cohorts as being composed of groups of people with clearly distinguishable properties 
(which may define social locations) such as speaking different languages, having 
different levels of educational attainment or different national/European identities, just 
to mention a couple of the examples that will be given below. Hence, the basic idea is 
not that generations are homogeneous but rather the opposite, that they are 
heterogeneous in measureable ways, but that their characteristics are sticky (persistent) 
along cohort lines and the composition of the properties in the entire population changes 
as a consequence of the changing proportions of cohorts who are carriers of the relevant 
characteristics. 
More than a generation after Mannheim the Canadian-American demographer 
Norman Ryder takes up the topic from a more demographic perspective.  His seminal 
essay on “The cohort as a concept in the study of social change” was published in ASR 
in 1965, but he mentions in a footnote that an earlier version of the paper was already 
presented in 1959. Some of these thoughts are also included in his 1980 book “The 
cohort approach” (Ryder 1980).  
Ryder starts from the central but (then and now) rarely used notion of 
“demographic metabolism” which he defines as the “massive process of personnel 
replacement” driven by the births, lives and deaths of individuals (p.843). While 
individuals pass away, societies become immortal, if reproduction is sufficient to offset 
mortality. This is combined with his second main thought, namely that this appearance 
of new individuals provides an “opportunity for social transformation”. While for 
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individuals the flexibility to change over their life time tends to be limited, “the 
continual emergence of new participants in the social process and the continual 
withdrawal of their predecessors compensate the society for limited individual 
flexibility” (p.844). Based on the assumed inflexibility of individuals over their 
lifetimes he arrives at the strong statement that “The society whose members were 
immortal would resemble a stagnant pond” (p.844). An important additional thought is, 
that “metabolism may make change likely, or at least possible, but it does not guarantee 
that the change in beneficial.” (p.844). 
Ryder defines a cohort in what has since become the standard demographic 
definition. “A cohort may be defined as the aggregate of individuals (within some 
population definition) who experienced the same event within the same 
interval.”(p.845). In most cases, birth is taken as the defining event, but this is only a 
special case of the more general approach. Cohorts differ from synthetic cross-sections 
(comparing people of different ages at the same point in time) because “time and age 
change pari-passu for any cohort”. Unlike Mannheim, Ryder allows for heterogeneity 
within generations/cohorts. This is also an important feature of the new theory 
introduced here, in which members of one birth cohort are subdivided into different 
categories such as groups with different educational attainment. Hence, under this 
definition a cohort is by its very nature an aggregate measure, i.e. refers to groups of 
people, or in the words of Ryder: “Thus a cohort experiences demographic 
transformation in ways that have no meaning at the individual level of analysis, because 
its composition is modified not only by status changes of the components, but also by 
selective changes of membership.” (p.845). 
But in contrast to Ryder’s writings this new theory does not necessarily depend 
on the assumption of complete cohort determinism. The below described tools of multi-
dimensional population dynamics do also allow for changes to happen over the life 
course of cohorts that may either be a function of age or of external period changes 
(such as the introduction of new technologies that affect all cohorts) and interactions 
between the two. Hence, the possibility of lifelong learning and changing of cohorts can 
in itself present a force of socioeconomic change and immortality would not necessarily 
result in a Ryder’s “stagnant pond”. To what degree cohort effects dominate over age 
and period effects is a matter of the specific characteristic studied. In some cases (such 
as highest educational attainment after a certain age) it is sticky by definition, in other 
cases this is a matter of empirical analysis for the past and corresponding assumptions 
for the future. 
Inspired by Norman Ryder, I chose the notion of “Demographic Metabolism” as 
the tentative name of this theory of socioeconomic change because it nicely addresses 
the very core of the idea: the changing nature of a population through the replacement 
of individuals with certain characteristics by individuals with others. However, unlike in 
Ryder’s definition the metabolism is not only seen to effect the population in its 
entirety, but the notion is also generalized to refer to the changing composition of 
certain sub-categories such as the labor force or the young adult population aged 20-30. 
This generalization of Ryder’s idea will be further discussed in the concluding 
discussion and outlook section. 
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3 A Macro-Level Theory based on People as Units 
Before we introduce the quantitative forecasting model and give numerical illustrations 
of specific applications of this theory it is necessary to specify and discuss some basic 
definitions and assumptions on which the whole approach rests. These foundations of 
the theory are presented in the form of four propositions. 
Proposition 1: People – i.e. individual members of the species homo sapiens – 
are the primarily building blocks of every society and the primary agents in any 
economy. They hence must form the basic elements of any theory of social and 
economic change. 
In the terminology of the pre-Soctratic philosophers people are the atoms (a-
tomos = things that cannot be further divided) of society. Theoretically, one could go 
further: In a similar way in which modern physics went on to study sub-atomic 
structures, modern brain research also shows that any decision at individual level is the 
result of complex interactions among different parts of our brains. But for the purpose 
of the theory presented here it is sufficient to assume that decisions happen at the level 
of individuals who then interact with other interactions. 
Proposition 2: For any population its members can be sub-divided into disjoint 
groups (states) according to clearly specified and measurable individual characteristics 
(in addition to their age and sex) for any given point in time.  
In principle, any sub-division of people that satisfies the above criteria is 
legitimate and allows the application of the here described theory. Age is a special kind 
of characteristic for forecasting because it automatically changes in tandem with 
chronological time. Hence, the way the following applications and illustrations are 
designed is to divide the entire population by whatever characteristics are of interest and 
then further sub-divide all people in this category by age and sex. Over time people can 
stay in their categories and simply get one year older every calendar year unless they die 
or move to another category.  
Proposition 3: At any point in time members of a sub-population (state) defined 
by certain characteristics can move to another state (associated with a change in 
characteristics) and these individual transitions can be mathematically described by a 
set of age- and sex-specific transition rates.  
Transitions may not only go to another state inside the system but also to an 
absorbing state (death) or to outside the system (out-migration).New individuals 
arriving (through birth or in-migration) will be instantly allocated to one state within the 
system.. Not all transitions among a given set of states may be possible. Sometimes 
transitions are only possible in one direction such as from lower to higher educational 
attainment categories or from the single to the married state from where people may 
move on to the divorced or widowed state, but cannot move back to the single state. 
Proposition 4: If any given population consists of sub-groups that are 
significantly different from each other with respect to relevant characteristics, then a 
change over time in the relative size of these sub-groups will result in a change in the 
overall distribution of these characteristics in the population and hence in 
socioeconomic change. 
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Human history offers many examples of very significant changes of entire 
cultures, economies and technologies as a consequence of the changing composition of 
populations. Most radical were the changes in the dominant characteristics among 
populations resulting from mass migrations combined with differential mortality. We 
may think of the end of the Roman Empire or the Spanish conquest of the Americas in 
this way: new people came bringing with them their very different ways of thinking, 
acting, and using technologies (characteristics) and replaced the previously dominant 
characteristics, thus causing radical social change. In such major transitions one may 
assume that not many individuals actually changed their characteristics over their life 
courses, i.e. made transitions to entirely new forms of behavior. Rather the holders of 
the old characteristics disappeared (through being killed, carried away by new diseases 
or outmigration) and were replaced by new arrivers and their offspring, a radical form 
of demographic metabolism. In some cases the surviving children of the holders of the 
old characteristics were also socialized to carry the new characteristics, thus creating a 
new and different society with the prevailing new characteristics through 
intergenerational change. Early efforts to assimilate aborigines in Australia were 
explicitly based on this strategy. On the other hand, existing characteristics can also be 
lost over generations without such major discontinuities. This is true for the abilities to 
speak many languages, that have simply died, and for exceptional artistic skills. The 
artists creating the famous bust of Nefertiti around 1350 BC  were part of a school of 
artists that had skills of producing lively images that afterwards were lost (through a 
lack of reproduction of such characteristics for whatever reason) until around three 
millennia later Renaissance artists approached this level of realism again. The history 
books are full of examples of this sort that can also be viewed as a consequence of the 
changing composition of the populations with respect to certain such characteristics 
which also include the abilities to use certain technologies. 
The choice of what is a relevant characteristic that is worth studying with respect 
to its changing distribution in a society can only be context specific. In a way all human 
beings are different and, in particular, when it comes to mind settings and identities no 
two people are identical. Hence, the definition of relevant sub-groups depends on the 
questions asked. In the second part of this paper I will give several empirical examples 
for using this approach to address specific questions concerning future socioeconomic 
change but before doing so, I will briefly present the methodological tool to carry out 
such forecasts. 
4 The Multi-Dimensional Cohort-Component Model 
Most demographic methods deal with the transitions of people from one state to another 
over a certain time interval and are in one way or another based on the life table. In its 
most fundamental form these two states are being alive and being dead and the life table 
was constructed on the basis of age-specific mortality rates to answer the question of 
what is the probability of surviving to age x and what are the remaining life 
expectancies at any given age. Early in demographic history these tables were 
calculated separately for men and women because observed age-specific mortality rates 
tended to differ substantially. Aside from this differentiation by age and sex 
conventional demography still mostly considers populations to be homogeneous, i.e. 
that for example all men aged 50-54 are exposed to the same risk of death. In the multi-
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state case this restriction is relaxed and mortality rates can differ for sub-groups as 
defined by further characteristics. 
The cohort-component model has become the dominant way of projecting 
populations. While a simple exponential growth model only considers changing 
population size as a function of the growth rate, the cohort-component model can deal 
with irregular age distributions and the differential impacts of fertility, mortality and 
migration patterns on future age structures. The one-dimensional cohort-component 
model starts with a population stratified by age and sex and then projects cohorts by 
advancing their age t years over every time interval of t years while at the same time 
exposing them to assumed age- and sex-specific schedules of mortality and migration 
and the female cohorts to age-specific fertility rates. Since fertility, mortality and 
migration are the three fundamental components of population change, this model of 
projecting along cohort lines is called the cohort-component model. In the multi-
dimensional case the population is further sub-divided along additional characteristics. 
Since the origins of the multi-state model lie in regional population studies, these 
additional divisions were initially sub-regions, e.g. provinces or states of one country. 
This explicitly heterogeneous population is then projected into the future by 
simultaneously considering different fertility, mortality and migration schedules for the 
individual states as well as transitions (migrations) among the states. More generally, 
states can also be defined by other criteria such as marital status, labor force 
participation and highest educational attainment. 
The simple cohort-component model goes back to Cannan (1895). Later it was 
formalized and widely applied by Whelpton (1936) and Leslie (1945) who also gave the 
Leslie Matrix its name. Since the detailed formal presentation of this model is given in 
any standard demography textbook (e.g. Preston et al. 2001) there is no need for a 
formal description here. The multi-state model is based on the generalization of the 
simple life table (single decrement table) to the multiple-decrement and increment-
decrement life tables (Rogers 1975, Schoen and Nelson 1974, Keyfitz 1985). Essentially 
they describe movements of people that can go back and forth between more than two 
states. These methodological advances which happened during the 1970s at and around 
the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) let naturally to the 
multi-state population projection model which can simultaneously project the 
populations of different categories (states, regions) which have different fertility, 
mortality and migration patterns as well as movements among the categories. Again, the 
methodology need not be formally described here since it is extensively documented 
elsewhere (Rogers 1975, Keyfitz 1985, Keyfitz and Caswell 2005, Rogers and 
Willekens 1986). Here it suffices to say that the methodology is based on the Markovian 
assumption that the probability of transition to another state is only defined by the 
presence in the current state in addition to age and sex. In other words, all persons of the 
same age and sex in the same state have identical risks of dying or moving to another 
state irrespective of their earlier transition histories. Typically, this assumption is not 
considered very restrictive, but if it turns out to be a problem for a specific application 
then one option is to increase the state space and group persons with different histories 
into different categories. 
After the initial focus on regionally defined states, applications were soon 
expanded to the analysis of marital status transitions (Schoen and Nelson 1974), the 
analysis of labor force participation and working life tables (Willekens 1978), the 
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analysis of health and morbidity (Manton 1988) as well as  family status cross-
classifying marital status and number of children (Lutz 1989). The application of the 
multi-state projection model to education was to my knowledge for the first time used in 
the context of an interdisciplinary in-depth systems analytical study of the complex 
population-development-environment interactions on the island of Mauritius (Lutz 
1994).  
 
Figure 1: A multi-dimensional projection model cross-classifying the population by 
age, sex, level of education and labor force participation (taken from Lutz 1994, p. 226) 
In the model developed for this case study on Mauritius the entire adult 
population is sub-divided into six states as defined by the cross-classification of three 
education categories (primary or less, secondary and tertiary) and labor force 
participation (see Figure 1). The children and in-school population constitute a seventh 
state. The chart also depicts all the essential transitions of the multi-state model: new 
births enter the category of child population which advances one year in age every 
calendar year and is simultaneously exposed to assumed sets of mortality and migration 
rates. At a given age then all children move on to become members of the adult 
population not (yet) in the labor force and according to their highest educational 
attainment. In adult age people can move back and forth between being out of the labor 
force and in the labor force and age one year every year within their respective 
categories being always exposed to age-specific mortality and migration risks which are 
status-specific. The female population of reproductive age is also exposed to assumed 
age-specific fertility rates – which differ by status – resulting in the births that then enter 
the model. 
While the chart in Figure 1 gives the structure of one specific model, it also 
shows the general design of a multi-dimensional demographic forecasting model. The 
following illustrations of other applications will only differ from it in their specific 
definitions of the state space and the possible transitions among states. 
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5 Modeling the Dynamics of Changing Educational Attainment 
Distributions by Age and Sex   
The above described multi-state model is most easily applicable in the sense that it 
requires the least assumptions for studying characteristics that are sticky, i.e. rather 
persistent over the individual life cycle. Highest educational attainment is one such 
characteristic which is typically attained at younger ages and then maintained 
throughout life. While this is almost entirely the case for primary and junior secondary 
education, the completion of tertiary education can also happen later in the life cycle. 
Since for many countries good data on the timing of transitions to higher levels of 
education exist, the age-pattern of education transitions can be appropriately modeled 
and taken into account. 
This stickiness of educational attainment over age becomes particularly visible 
when looking at the educational attainment distributions by age for countries that 
recently experienced significant increases in education. Figure 2 shows the education 
and age pyramids for South Korea as reconstructed and projected using the model of 
multi-dimensional population dynamics. Here, the education dimension has been added 
to the conventional age pyramids through color (shading) with the following four 
educational categories: red- never been to school, yellow- some primary education, 
green- completed junior secondary education, blue- completed first level tertiary. These 
60 years of improvements in human capital in South Korea reflect probably the most 
rapid and most impressive expansion in education in human history so far. While in 
1960 the majority of the female population above age 20 had never been to school, 30 
years later in history ( in 1990)  the population below age 50 already has near universal 
secondary education, whereas the cohorts above age 50 remain very poorly educated. 
By 2020 most of the uneducated older cohorts will have died while young women in 
Korea will be among the world’s most educated with almost half of them having 
completed college. By then the demographic metabolism at the population level will 
have fully run its course and Korea in 2020 will be a different society and economy than 
it was in 1960 in almost every imaginable dimension.  
The data plotted in Figure 2 come from a major ongoing project carried out by 
the Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital (a collaboration 
between IIASA, the Austrian Academy of Sciences and the Vienna University of 
Business and Economics) to reconstruct and project educational attainment distributions 
by age and sex for more than 170 countries in the world (Lutz et al. 2007, KC et al 
2010, Lutz and KC 2011). While the reconstruction part uses the past age and sex 
distributions as given by the UN Population Division and therefore only needs to 
consider differential mortality (and where possible migration) by level of education, the 
projection part also includes education-specific fertility rates. 
This reconstruction of the attainment distributions by age and sex also produced 
a unique new data set which is superior to other existing data sets of the past (Barro and 
Lee 1996, Dela Fuente and Domenech 2006, Cohen and Soto 2007, Benhabib and 
Spiegel 1994) in at least four dimensions : (1) because of its detail (four educational 
categories for 5-year age groups of men and women) for more than  
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categories over time, which is a major problem in empirical historical data sets, in 
which the underlying educational definitions often change, and (4) because of its natural 
extension to forecasting.  
These new data have already formed the basis for a reassessment of the global 
empirical evidence with respect to several important aggregate level returns to 
education (Lutz and KC 2011). While there is little doubt that education has an 
important positive effect on individual earnings the evidence on aggregate-level 
economic growth has been more ambiguous so far (Becker 1993, Barro and Sala-i-
Martin 2003, Benhabib and Spiegel 1994, Pritchett 2001). However, these studies were 
only based on the best so far available data using typically the mean years of schooling 
of the entire adult population above age 25. As Figure 2 clearly illustrates for Korea e.g. 
in 1990 this crude indicator averages the human capital of the elderly uneducated 
cohorts with that of the highly educated young ones. As a result, this crude indicator has 
little statistical signal in its change over time and does not correlate strongly with the 
increase in economic growth which in Korea took off when the better educated cohorts 
entered the young adult ages. A recent study estimating economic growth regressions 
using the above described new age-specific human capital indicators found consistently 
positive and significant effects of educational attainment on economic growth (Lutz et 
al. 2008).   Because it also included the full educational attainment distributions (and 
not just mean years of schooling) his study also could show that for the poorest 
countries it is essential to complement primary education with broad based secondary 
education in order to boost economic growth. This also has a stronger effect on poverty 
eradication than focusing on tertiary education in an otherwise largely uneducated 
population. 
Beyond economic growth, this new data was also used to reassess at the 
aggregate level the returns to education on a broad range of outcomes from population 
growth and health to quality of institutions.  For instance, it could be shown that the 
time when large cohorts of better educated men and women enter the young adult ages 
plays a key role in the transitions of societies to modern democracies, as assessed 
through an analysis of global time series (Lutz et al. 2010). 
As shown in the case of South Korea, the multi-dimensional demographic 
approach with a focus on age, sex and level of education can provide a portrait of key 
dimensions – if not the single most important dimension – of the phenomenal 
socioeconomic change that Korea experienced over the past decades. Starting in the 
1940s and -50s in a situation of abject poverty – worse than many Eastern African 
countries at the same time – and a setting in which more than 80 percent of the 
population received no schooling at all, a massive expansion of schooling at the primary 
and then secondary level resulted not only in a strong fertility decline (complemented 
by an effective family planning program) but was also a necessary condition for the 
stunning rates of economic growth that followed. While human capital alone may be not 
sufficient and effective governance and the right macro-economic strategies are also 
important, it is hard to see how Korea and the other Asian tigers could have had this 
economic success without the underlying changes in human capital that facilitated the 
transformation from agriculture to industry and the associated gains in productivity. As 
the Figure 2 clearly illustrates, this change happened along cohort lines where in each 
relevant age group (such as the younger working ages) the demographic metabolism 
was the major engine of change One could even go further and say that an informed 
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observer of developments in Korea around 1970 when this major education expansion 
was already far advanced could have predicted the dramatic subsequent changes in the 
socioeconomic development of the country would he/she had this new theory at his/her 
disposal.  
Moreover, the rapid improvement in the education particularly of younger 
women  brought fundamental changes to Korean family structure and society in general. 
The Total Fertility Rate declined from around 6.0 in the late 1950s to around 1.2 today. 
This dramatic change is also visible in the changing age structure as depicted in Figure 
2. Korea is facing massive population aging. It is not yet clear to what extent this will 
pose a problem in the context of the fact that the young generations are among the best 
educated in the world which will not only imply higher productivity but also likely 
result in much better health at higher ages and a later age at retirement. While these 
specific economic consequences of aging cannot be readily forecast by this new theory 
of social change (partly because they have no precedence in human history so far), the 
fundamental underlying forces of ageing and changing characteristics along cohort lines 
can well be forecast with high certainty. These forecasts are likely to be more accurate 
and more relevant than those of most macro-economic models over a similar time 
horizon.     
6 Predicting “Soft” Variables such as Preferences and 
Identities 
The other example of the theory presented here comes from a field that is both highly 
contentious and highly political and is usually considered beyond the reach of 
quantitative modeling, not to even mention forecasting. It will discuss the results of a 
recent study using the multi-dimensional demographic approach for predicting the 
future evolution of European identity among EU citizens. The following description of 
this study heavily draws on its publication in Lutz et al. (2006). 
Many political observers of the current economic crisis and its effect on the Euro 
as well as the future of the European Union expect a revival of nationalism in many 
member countries and as a result a possible break-up of the EU. It is often argued that 
already existing economic interdependencies (particularly in the banking sector) are the 
main force that still holds the EU together. These people forget to consider the changing 
opinions and identities of the European citizens, the people who make up Europe. 
Scholars in political science tend to think that the question of identity is crucial 
for the legitimacy of any political system (Easton 1965). In this view the future of the 
European Union primarily depends on whether or not the European citizens (the demos 
of Europe) have a European identity or not. Furthermore, recent work stresses the view 
that people usually have multiple identities which do not necessarily compete with each 
other. In this view European identity complements but does not displace national and 
regional identities (Risse 2000). Naturally, the European Commission is interested in 
this issue and has for long collected information on it in the Eurobarometer surveys 
(EB). The relevant question on European identity asks:  “In the near future, do you see 
yourself as [Nationality] only, as [Nationality] and European, as European and 
[Nationality] or European only?” Since 1996 this question has been asked with identical 
wording more than a dozen times in the EU-15 (members of the EU as of 1995) with 
national samples of around 1000 in each round.  
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In 2004, 42  percent of the adult population above age 18 of the EU-15 said that 
they felt themselves to be solely nationals of their own country, while 58 percent gave 
an answer which reflected multiple identities including a European identity.  As Figure 
3 shows for the empirical data for 1996 and 2004, there is a clear decline in multiple 
identity with age. The older the respondent, the higher the chance that he or she will feel 
only a national identity. While for younger age groups those with only national 
identities are a minority, for the population above age 60 they constitute a majority.  
 
Figure 3: Proportion of the European population with multiple identity (including 
European identity) by age, 1996, 2004 and forecast to 2030. 
Does this pronounced age pattern imply that as people get older they tend to 
have more of a national identity only and give up multiply identities they might have 
held earlier? In this case of a dominating age effect, the significant population ageing 
expected for the coming decades would imply a decline in the proportion of citizens 
with multiple identities. Yet, the same pattern could also be explained in terms of a 
cohort effect: young cohorts are being socialized in a way that they have higher 
prevalence of multiple identities than the previous cohorts from a young age on which 
they then maintain throughout their lives. This force would result in significant 
increases in future European identity through demographic metabolism (the younger 
more European minded cohorts replacing the older ones).  
Both of these contradictory interpretations are possible and based on one cross-
sectional survey alone their validity cannot be assessed empirically. Only panel data, 
i.e., age profiles at different points in time, allow us to discriminate between age and 
cohort effects.  
Lutz et al (2006) carried out statistical analyses showing a highly significant 
positive cohort effect. The resulting coefficient of 0.48 means that for cohorts born one 
year later, the proportion with multiple identities is on average half a percentage point 
higher. This confirms the view that the change towards more multiple identities in the 
European Union largely happens along cohort lines, i.e., cohorts born later in time are 
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socialized in such a way that they adopt fewer solely national identities, and more 
multiple identities. They then largely maintain these identities throughout their lives.  
Since expressed national versus European identity can be viewed as a 
characteristic of individuals meeting the above defined criteria, its changing prevalence 
in the population can also be modeled and forecast using the multi-dimensional model 
introduced here. Doing so Lutz et al (2006) forecast the future trends in the degree of 
multiple identities in Europe under the assumption that the estimated cohort effect 
remains effective over time. In other words, they incorporate the assumption that in 
each subsequent cohort the proportion with multiple identities increases by 0.5 
percentage points and remains stable along cohort lines. The top line in Figure 3 gives 
the resulting predicted age-specific proportions with multiple identities in 2030, and 
shows a marked upward shift. In terms of absolute numbers the results show that in 
2030, there will be only 104 million adult European Union Citizens (EU-15) who have 
strictly national identities, while there will be 226 million with multiple identities. This 
study also suggests that very strong country differentials are likely to persist, but on 
average in Europe, the relentless forces of cohort replacement by which the older, more 
nationally-oriented cohorts will die and the younger, more European-minded cohorts 
will take their place, are likely to bring about significant changes in the pattern of 
European identity. These predicted tectonic shifts in European identity are likely to have 
significant longer-term implications for the more fundamental political and economic 
developments in Europe, while short-term politics and market reactions are likely to 
continue in a volatile manner.  With view on the current political debate in Europe and 
the well established centrality of national/European identity for the legitimacy of 
institutions, this study can lead to the conclusion that most commentators and analysts 
miss out on referring to one of the most important forces that can likely lead to more 
European integration in the future, namely the demographic metabolism that will 
replace predominantly nationalistic cohorts through younger ones that predominantly 
also identify with Europe.   
If the theory of socioeconomic change introduced in this paper can produce 
quantitative forecasts for issues that are as soft and qualitative as the notion of 
national/European identity, it can also effectively be applied to forecasting the future 
prevalence of a large array of personal views, opinions, preferences and values.  The 
only precondition for the applicability of this theory is the availability of data that allow 
a clear discrimination between the different categories of the characteristics studied and 
the establishment of the existence and strength of a cohort effect as well as information 
on age/duration-specific transition rates. 
7 Discussion and Outlook 
Virtually every existing population of humans can be meaningfully subdivided into 
groups whose members differ from each other according to measurable characteristics 
which also matter for their behavior. If membership in these groups is stable over the 
life course after a certain age (such as ethnicity, native language, highest educational 
attainment or stable values and identities) or shows patterns of transition that can be 
modeled based on plausible assumptions (such as  marital status, labor force 
participation, income group, health status etc.) then the multi-dimensional demographic 
approach allows us to model how societies change over time as a function of the 
changing relative sizes of these sub-groups. I do not know of any other theory in the 
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social sciences that has potentially greater predictive power over decades into the future 
than this one based on demographic metabolism. 
Many open questions remain. Some of them will be mentioned in this 
concluding section and some will be elaborated in subsequent papers.  The main 
purpose of this paper is to put this comprehensive new theory of socioeconomic change 
on the table for the first time; further elaboration will be needed both on the formal and 
on the substantive side. 
One key issue that requires significant further elaboration is the question of how 
to deal with uncertainty in the context of prediction. Over the past two decades an 
extensive body of literature on probabilistic population projections has developed (Lutz 
and Goldstein 2004, Lee 1998). These approaches that replace point forecasts with 
ranges of explicitly stated uncertainty can, in principle, also be applied to the kinds of 
multi-dimensional forecasts presented here. The main practical problem is that the 
uncertainty distributions need to be established for a much larger number of input 
parameters and there often is not much of an empirical basis for grounding these 
assumptions. Yet, the more serious issue lies is of a more theoretical nature and relates 
to the possibility of falsification of probabilistic statements. Under a probabilistic view 
the probability of actually realizing a precise point forecast is practically zero because it 
almost certainly will be somewhat higher or lower. This same problem arises with most 
predictive theories in the natural sciences.  Nobody would expect a precise point 
prediction over decades into the future. On the other hand, too broad uncertainty 
intervals are also unsatisfactory, since they do not offer enough information and are 
difficult to falsify. As the question of falsification of probabilistic statements is one of 
the big and complex issues which seem to be still largely unresolved in the theory of 
science literature (Pearl 2000), it would not be specific for this theory of demographic 
metabolism. However, since this is one of the few social science theories which claim to 
have predictive power, it is certainly worthwhile to further discuss this question in a 
specific social science context. 
The space in this paper only allowed for the description of two examples of 
predictions based on this new theory of demographic metabolism. But these two already 
show that this concept can be operationalized in a practical and meaningful way 
resulting in new and relevant information about the future that was not available before. 
As discussed in the introduction, these novel predictions of previously unknown 
phenomena correspond precisely to the criterion that Imre Lakatos (1978) gave for 
distinguishing a good theory from “pseudoscience”. 
The examples given also illustrate that the theory is applicable to almost any 
other meaningful and measurable sub-division of the population and even for cases in 
which the persistence along cohort lines is more questionable and becomes a matter of 
empirical assessment.  
This demographic theory can possibly bring innovation not only to sociology but 
also to economics. Demographers tend to use many sociological and economic concepts 
in their work. Why should not a genuinely demographic concept, applied far beyond the 
traditional realm of demography also prove to advance thinking in those other 
disciplines. While for sociology and the study of social change the applicability of this 
theory is fairly clear – it was not a coincidence that Ryder published his seminal paper 
in a leading sociology journal –, there are many relevant aspects for economics as well.  
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Wherever in economics the almost ubiquitous assumption of strictly homogeneous 
human agents is considered as too strong this model offers a quantitative way of 
explicitly addressing this heterogeneity: this can range from distinguishing between 
groups of people that have different sets of indifference curves underlying their choices 
to groups of people with different discount rates in their assessment of utilities to people 
that have different degrees of rationality in their behaviors.  
Finally, it should be stressed that the innovative aspect of this paper does not lie 
in the methodologies of multi-dimensional mathematical (multi-state) demography or in 
highlighting the importance of changes along cohort lines-both have been well 
established in the scientific literature for the past 40-50 years, although they tended to 
remain at a lower level of attention. The new feature of  this paper is the combination of  
these elements in a way that forms a comprehensive theory of socioeconomic change 
with quantitative predictive power. To my knowledge no other comprehensive theory 
with such properties exists to date. If accepted and further corroborated,  this theory can 
bring a major paradigm shift  in the way socioeconomic change is viewed, analyzed and 
forecast with direct implications for policy decisions and choices made today at the 
level of individuals, companies and societies. 
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Notes 
 
1
 To my knowledge, Karl Popper has never explicitly written about demographic theories, but thanks to 
his desire to eat his favorite dish (Wiener Erdäpfelgulasch = Viennese potato goulash), I had the 
opportunity to have a lengthy discussion with him about this topic in 1984, when I stayed in London for 
an internship with the World Fertility Survey and his private doctor in Vienna asked me to deliver a larger 
number of packs with his favorite dish to him. In return for this service, he talked to me at his private 
residence, patiently answering the questions of an eager young demographer with an interest in 
philosophy of science. In essence, what he told me about the role of theories in demography was: With 
respect to the validity of theories, demography is not different from all the other sciences. But through its 
quantitative nature it should be actually easier than in many other social sciences to define hypotheses and 
theories that are specific enough so that they can be tested, i.e. potentially falsified. He also asked what 
would be the most important theories with predictive power in demography. After some hard thinking I 
could only come up with the theory of demographic transition which predicts that all societies starting 
from pre-modern conditions will experience a fertility decline following the mortality decline. Despite its 
lack of precision about the time lags involved and the precise course of fertility decline, this theory has 
predictive power and as a consequence underlies all the population projections for developing countries 
where further fertility declines to at least replacement levels are being assumed. After listening to my 
explanations with interest, he then asked whether demographic models could be applied to forecast other 
social trends as well, in particular utilizing the great inertia of population changes over time. Since I had 
never thought about it in this way, he encouraged me to do so. And it took me over 25 years to finally 
take up the challenge. 
(I remember well his last words as we waited for the taxi outside his house which would bring me back to 
the train: “As scientists we have to be like bats, sending out signals to an unknown world and based on 
the echoes we receive, build an image (theory) which is the basis for predictions where we can safely fly. 
And as we fly, we have to listen very carefully to be able to update our predictions”. Looking back, I 
remember that he had particularly big ears.) 
 
